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FiReControl “yet another catalogue of further poor judgement and mismanagement” by Department of Communities and Local Government, but should “press ahead”
The Government's programme to replace 46 local fire and rescue service control rooms with nine purpose-built regional control centres has been inadequately planned, poorly executed, and badly managed, says the Communities and Local Government Select Committee
Launching a report of an inquiry into the FiReControl project, CLG Committee Chair Dr Phyllis Starkey said, "The original aims and expected benefits of this scheme were, in our view, sound. But the department has clearly not learned from its previous mistakes with the New Dimension project. FiReControl is yet another catalogue of further poor judgement and mismanagement."
On balance, however, given the investment of public funds already committed, and the benefits that will accrue, MPs conclude that DCLG should press ahead with the FireControl project so long as Ministers can agree urgently a viable project plan that will see the project go live by a target date of mid-2011 and in which the main stakeholders can have confidence.
After examining the project closely the Committee concludes that the future of a prompt and efficient and modern mobilisation system for the fire service has been put at substantial risk because:
* The original agreement with the IT contractor was ill-suited to the nature of the project and there was insufficient consultation with end-users.
* High staff turnover within DCLG, especially at a senior level, compromised the Department's ability to manage the project effectively.
* Relationships with major stakeholders and contractual partners have been mishandled. A lack of openness, collaboration and explanation by DCLG means many Fire and Rescue Authorities now have profound reservations about whether the new regional system will deliver a more efficient, safer service.
* Escalating costs and severe delays look set to leave several key Fire and Rescue Authorities managing their migration to a new system at the time they should be preparing for the high-profile safety concerns presented by the Olympic Games in 2012.
* The fate of the project remains further exposed by an adversarial relationship between DCLG and the main IT contractor, EADS.
Lastly, the committee also condemns the Government's refusal to allow the Committee sight of independent management reviews for the project – even in confidence. Commenting on this point, Dr Starkey adds, "This refusal implies the department is deeply insecure about its handling of the FiReControl project and unwilling to be accountable. This is regrettable. "
Looking forward, the committee concludes that the excessive cost of abandoning the project – an extra £8 million more than it will cost to complete – indicates the Department should continue with the project so long as it also:
* examines alternatives and provides assurances that FiReControl represents the best viable option for the future of Fire and Rescue Services;
* resolves its contractual dispute with EADS and implements a viable project plan;
* addresses the shortcomings in its management of the project;
* consults fully with FRS staff and professionals to define end-user requirements
* provides assurances that the safety and security of the Olympic Games will not be compromised by the roll-out of new Regional Control Centres
In addition, the committee calls on DCLG urgently to draw up and consult on contingency plans for any further failures in the FiReControl programme to ensure ongoing safe and effective fire and rescue services cover across the whole country whether or not the regional control centres are eventually delivered.
The full report is available here.
Committee Membership is as follows:
Dr Phyllis Starkey MP (Chair, Lab), Sir Paul Beresford MP (Con), Mr Clive Betts MP (Lab), John Cummings MP (Lab), Andrew George (Lib Dem), Mr Greg Hands MP (Con), Anne Main MP (Con), Dr John Pugh MP (Lib Dem), Alison Seabeck MP (Lab), Andrew Slaughter MP (Lab), Mr Neil Turner MP (Lab)
Excerpts from the report
“In all of these inquiries, we raised concern, and expressed some scepticism, about the basic premise of the FiReControl project, as well as its implementation and management. The project has been beset by problems since its inception. Our major Report, published in June 2006, The Fire and Rescue Service, studied the progress made in the FRS since the 2003 White Paper, Our Fire and Rescue Service, and the subsequent Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. One chapter was devoted to the FiReControl programme, which was then still in its infancy, and raised concerns that are still in existence today, including whether the project will enhance resilience, whether the technological infrastructure is adequate, and whether sufficient funding and governance arrangements are in place.”
“Our inquiry has been hampered by the Government's decision not to provide us with sight of various reviews of the FiReControl project carried out for CLG.”
“Indeed, given the weight of evidence we have received from other parties, we suspect that the Department’s references to their conclusions are at best disingenuous, and possibly downright misleading. In the report below, we come to our own conclusions about the Department’s management of this project, and about how the Government should best proceed from here.”
Matt Wrack, General Secretary of the FBU: “On behalf of the Fire Brigades Union we have opposed the FiReControl project from the start on grounds of its operational usefulness to the Fire and Rescue Service, on the basis of its threat to the efficiency of the Fire and Rescue Service, on the basis of local accountability and on the basis of cost. I have to say that the previous seven years have just confirmed our position more so than when we started out.”
John Bonney, President of the CFOA: “The professional Association’s view very much remains as it did at the inception – that we are very committed to the principles and aspirations of the project. We are concerned, as it has developed, at how badly parts of it have been managed and in recent times we have been clear that there needs to be an alternative plan worked up because of our concern about some of the risks with the project at the moment, but in terms of aspirations and the objective of the FiReControl project, we are still very much committed to that.”
Councillor Coleman: “The LGA’s position has in fact changed. Having been broadly supportive although quite ambivalent, especially among member fire authorities, we have now moved to a position of hostility and against the project in principle. We have asked officers of the LGA to work up alternatives, rather in line with CFOA, because member fire authorities have come to the view that the project has just been delayed for far too long and they have serious doubts whether it is ever going to work.”
“The FiReControl project began in 2004 and was due for completion, with all RCCs being fully operational, in 2009. However, on 26 November 2008, CLG announced a delay to the programme, with the ‘go-live’ date for first RCCs extended by nine months. On 15 July 2009, CLG announced a further 10-month extension to this timetable, which means the first FRSs will now switch over to the RCCs in May 2011—three years later than the first switchover was originally planned and 19 months later than planned when the IT contract was awarded—and all regional control centres are scheduled to be switched over by the end of 2012."
“Yorkshire and Humberside Regional Management Board’s written submission exemplifies many views sent to us, in placing the blame on CLG: ‘The numerous delays in the delivery of this project have led to a lack of confidence in the ability of CLG to deliver a complex project of this nature. The problem stems again from a lack of user engagement at the early stages of the project. From the beginning CLG seems to have failed to grasp the complex nature of this project. If this project is to deliver its objectives there needs to be a new culture of working in partnership with the FRS, more realistic goals and timescales need to be set. This has not always been the case to date.’”
“In oral evidence, EADS were confident that their new, revised timetable would be met, with Robin Southwell asserting that “we are hitting our milestones”25 and “we are committed to that [delivery] date” of mid-2011. The Minister gave a more reserved endorsement of the agreed timetable: “I cannot sit here and say to you 100 per cent. that it will happen on time, but all the information I have at hand tells me that it ought to happen”
Technical issues
“It is unclear to what extent CLG is managing its risk with EADS and EADS’ subcontractor for this product, in relation to the current timetable. CLG’s caution in oral evidence about the extent to which the current timetable is achievable may be coupled with a statement in its written evidence when discussing this part of the project which falls some way short of total confidence in the ability of its contractors to deliver:
“In contractual terms, we have demanded, and received, greater visibility of deliverables and more interim/shorter milestones from EADS. We will continue to take a close ‘hands on’ management and assurance role and be vigilant for signs of slippage of loss of quality in outputs.’”
“The current FiReControl timetable also relies on FRSs having the required information and staffing levels to meet the timetable as well, as is explained by the Oxfordshire FRA written evidence:
‘The failure to finalise the technical solution for the project has led to the national team being unable to provide sufficient detail to allow the FRS to work on its own actions to put the processes and data systems to support FiReControl in place. This is a major activity requiring considerable FRS specialist resource (a scarce commodity) and required sufficient lead-time. An inability to progress work poses an increasing risk that when the information finally becomes available FRSs will be unable to resource the necessary work to meet the project timescale.’”
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games
“Both the Minister and Robin Southwell discussed the ‘go-live’ date of mid 2011. However, that date is misleading as it refers only to the current go-live date for the first three regional control centres. Much of the written evidence shows concern about the new timetable, whereby all regional control centres will become operational by the end of 2012, because that will mean that the changeover from local control rooms to some RCCs will coincide with the Olympic Games.”
Alternatives to FiReControl
“The NAO states that, to date, CLG has spent £202 million on the project. If FiReControl were not to proceed, the £205 million of future lease payments on FiReControl buildings would transfer to the Department. The Department estimated that a further £24 million would be spent on winding up the project. This would bring the total cost to the Department of discontinuing the project to £431 million, £8 million more than the cost of continuing with the project.”
CFOA’s John Bonney: “Fire and rescue authorities have not been investing in their fire controls in the expectation that the regional control centres would be brought in. We are now saying there is a point we have now reached with the confidence on the project, although we are still committed to the project, where we do believe there needs to be an alternative provided if, for whatever reason, the project is scrapped. We cannot leave fire and rescue services high and dry.”
Procurement issues
CFOA’s John Bonney:“the rush to procurement meant the level of detail in the specification did not reflect what the professional people were saying. That has plagued the project ever since, both in terms of delays and being over-optimistic about how quickly it could be delivered, how much it was going to cost, and why certain things that were absolutely necessary were never specified and other things were put in that were not needed.”
“While representatives from the LGA, CFOA and LGA at our oral evidence session in February 2010 blamed CLG for rushing the procurement stage, Mr. Housden, Permanent Secretary at CLG, at our oral evidence session on the Departmental Annual Report on 19 October 2009, blamed the delay of the FiReControl project on the failures of EADS to deliver.”
John Bonney: “who said that CFOA found [...] not only was there not the organised contact with EADS—we were kept at arm’s length, it was through CLG—but the relationship between CLG and EADS was adversarial because it was already in a contractual relationship rather than a partnership approach. That would have been all right if we had got a very clear detailed specification, but when you do not have that you end up, if you are not careful, only sorting the problems out by means of resorting to the legal arrangements. I think that is fundamentally where the difficulties existed.
“However, the NAO points out that, to date, there is no agreed project plan for FiReControl:
‘An initial project plan from EADS in November 2009 indicated a system delivery date later than required in the Department’s project plan. To date, a detailed and fully scoped project plan has yet to be agreed between the Department and EADS. This is contingent on EADS first fulfilling its obligation under a contract milestone to provide a detailed updated plan. The reliability and credibility of the Department’s current published project plan, cost estimates and risk assessments have already been questioned by both the OGC and the external reviews. [...] EADS and the Department are working to agree a new project plan up to project completion and put this on a contractual basis.’”
Co-ordination between Firelink and FiReControl
“This hardware is inextricably linked to the FiReControl software system, yet, according to CFOA’s written evidence, the two projects were not integrated:
‘At the time of inception of the FiReControl Project the Government was already running the Firelink Project to procure a new wide area radio communications system for the fire and rescue service in England, Scotland and Wales. Whilst recognising the synergies between the projects and the key contribution that the Firelink solution would make to the FiReControl Project, Government failed to integrate the two projects and realise the efficiencies, both in terms of staff and consultancy costs. There was also no alignment of requirements and this resulted in silo working, duplication and inefficiencies. These examples illustrate the chaotic, uncoordinated and poorly conceived development of Government policy in this area to the detriment of the FiReControl project.
CLG’s project management team
“In our oral evidence session on last year’s Departmental Annual Report, Mr. Housden admitted that—five years into the FiReControl project—CLG did not have staff with the relevant specialist knowledge to ensure that EADS was up to speed.”
“Ms Dunn (Shona Dunn, Director for Fire and Resilience) went on to say that CLG had strengthened its senior project team within the last 12 to 18 months and there are a significant number of new individuals on the team. Although welcome as far as they go, these assurances do little to allay concerns about the significant level of staff turnover associated with the project.”
Lack of consultation and collaboration in the FiReControl project
“the general lack of consultation by CLG is a major theme running through both the written and oral evidence. During most of the FiReControl project’s existence, up until about a year ago, there was a lack of consultation and collaboration between CLG, EADS, the FRAs and the LACCs, despite the legal responsibility of FRAs to prevent or deal with fires and the safety risks connected with this.”
End-user requirement
“The exclusion of staff from any involvement with the specification and development of FiReControl led not only to delays, caused by a failure to appreciate the end-user needs of the system, but also to the demoralisation of staff and their sense of alienation from the project.”
Solution Establishment Workshops (SEWs)
“CFOA sent the following information about SEWs, describing what it considers to be a fundamental flaw in their approach:
‘The Solution Establishment Workshops (SEWs) are a welcome improvement in user engagement but remain fundamentally flawed in their approach to system design. Each SEW has been focussed on developing a single thread of functionality in isolation. Where demonstrations of functionality have been possible, they have been on the basis of unrepresentative data and, when requirements are not apparently met, assurances are given that the functionality will be provided from “a different module” or by “workarounds”. This gives rise to concerns that the system will be unnecessarily complex, unworkable and possibly fail to meet requirements when subjected to tests using real end-to-end scenarios and real fire service data.’”
Relationship between Local Authority Controlled Companies, Regional Control Centres and existing local control rooms
“When asked in oral evidence how much the RCCs are currently costing, Shona Dunn commented: 'At the moment there are eight regional control centre buildings that have reached practical completion. The ninth regional control centre, which is London’s, will achieve practical completion in the next few weeks. At the moment I think the monthly lease costs for all of the buildings is around £850,000 and that will rise to just over £1 million a month once the ninth regional control centre is completed.’”
“The London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) memorandum criticizes the RCC building specifications: ‘The buildings themselves appear to be over specified and are clearly too large just to house a regional control centre. The security arrangements incorporated into the premises appear to be in excess to the threats potentially posed to the buildings. These two things have led to significantly increased costs that will result in a long term revenue burden to fire authorities. Although too late to change, we would like to challenge the design of the buildings and ask why they are so large as we are unaware of the user input into the design process. Had users been more fully engaged in the design process the buildings may have been more suitable for purpose and there may have been more than one design of building that could have catered for specific user requirements. Such an approach may well have led to reduced overall costs.’”
“Matt Wrack, General Secretary of the FBU, told us that [...] ‘we have a number of empty buildings which are of no current use to the Fire and Rescue Service costing the taxpayer £40,000 a day. That is more than it costs to employ a firefighter for a year and that is a gross waste of public money.’”
“John Bonney said that the level of over-specification in the centres was ‘staggering’. Councillor Pearson commented on a £25,000 coffee machine recently installed in the London centre’”…
Legal issues
“On the basis of the evidence given to us by representatives both of FRAs and of the professionals in the fire service, however, we are unconvinced that all FRAs will ultimately sign up to the new system. The Minister’s remarks need to be supported by CLG involving FRAs far more intimately in ensuring that FRAs and the Chief Fire Officers are persuaded of the merits of the FiReControl project.”
Existing local control rooms
“Councillor Pearson from the LGA commented on Cheshire FRA: ‘There are a number of fire and rescue authorities who expected this project to be in by now who have not invested in renewing their control systems, and their control systems have fallen over. There is an example in Cheshire where two years ago they had to renew at vast expense. CLG are picking up the tab for this [...]’”
“In supplementary written evidence, the CFOA provided a table of a sample of 25 FRAs that had replaced or upgraded existing systems and that had received financial help from CLG. The cost of the works ranges from £30,000 to £479,000. Of that sample, CLG contributed £384,000 to the cost in three FRAs, out of a total cost of around £6,718,000. This supplementary evidence illustrates the piecemeal approach that CLG has taken towards contributing to FRAs’ costs.”
Costs
“It is disappointing that the estimated efficiency savings achieved through FiReControl have been revised downwards significantly during the course of the project. It is particularly unhelpful that one such reduction was caused by CLG’s inaccurate data about current running costs of existing local control rooms.”
“The NAO states that the Department currently predicts that the FiReControl project will cost £423 million. Whilst the Department originally expected the project to realize efficiencies and save costs locally that would be in excess of the costs of the project, the Department now expects the overall project to cost £240 million128 more than the local savings forecast. Not every Fire and Rescue Authority will make net annual cost savings locally as a result of the project. The Department plans to make annual payments of £8.2 million to these Fire and Rescue Authorities.”
